China: In 2025, produces hay despite unfavorable weather

China: Recent years have seen unrest in China, particularly following the release of COVID-19. But for Chairman Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2025 seemed to be a better year. Much of this may be attributed to the turbulent environment we live in, which was exacerbated by President Donald Trump.

Trump took office on January 20, 2025, but his use of tariffs on people in the near and distant and his criticism of European countries quickly angered many of his supporters.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the leader of Ukraine, was severely chastised by Trump, who sometimes seemed more interested in paying tribute to Vladimir Putin. He has also been unable to halt Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in spite of his pledges.

Additionally, Trump often gives the impression that his primary goal is to profit from China, as seen by his ill-advised approval of Nvidia’s sale of H200 artificial intelligence computer processors.

While Trump was busy stepping on people’s toes, Xi has been portraying China as a global force for good and himself as a responsible statesman.

By accusing the US of upsetting the global order and claiming to be an advocate for free trade, development aid, and international law, Xi is specifically targeting the so-called Global South.

However, such moves have been deceptive, as China’s destabilizing activities remain unchecked. But China has been making hay while the rest of the world is distracted by Trump’s antics and the war in Gaza and Ukraine.

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said in its “2025 Annual Report to Congress” that “General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping has persisted in challenging US global leadership and asserting China’s position on the world stage…”

Of fact, Trump’s unpredictable actions have helped Xi. Trump’s interactions with China have been marked by mistakes rather than a coordinated, all-encompassing strategy.

According to the report, “Beijing has continued its efforts to construct an alternative world order with itself at the centre – symbolised most powerfully in 2025 by images of the leaders of Russia, North Korea, Iran and about 20 other mostly authoritarian countries gathered behind Xi Jinping at a military parade in Beijing commemorating China’s victory in World War Two.”

In fact, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) magnificent military demonstration in Tiananmen Square on September 3, 2025, was the pinnacle of the organization. A confusing variety of missiles was among the many new pieces of equipment shown by the military.

Significantly, China is increasing the size of its sizable nuclear weapon stockpile. In addition to submarine-launched and air-launched nuclear-tipped missiles, it showcased three different kinds of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles during the parade.

2025 was a year of significant disclosures, according to Sam Roggeveen, Program Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute in Australia: “In fact, I cannot recall a more dramatic year in my time as a PLA watcher.”

Roggeveen emphasized these points in addition to the slow release of further details regarding China’s prototype sixth-generation aircraft, including a tailless one.

The launch of a new [Type 076] amphibious vessel for which there is no worldwide equivalent, the commissioning of China’s third aircraft carrier, the seemingly excellent performance of Chinese weapons in Pakistan’s aerial skirmish with India over Kashmir, evidence that China is building a military headquarters outside Beijing roughly ten times the size of the Pentagon, numerous new combat drone designs, the Beijing military parade, strong photographic indications of a fourth aircraft carrier under construction (possibly the largest warship ever built), and…the first pictures of a new class of military transport aircraft. This is not a comprehensive list.

Roggeveen said that China still lags behind the US and Russia in several sectors, such as nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft engines, and has gaps in its capabilities, such as anti-submarine warfare. But in terms of military technology, “China is no longer a copycat or ‘quick follower’. It is a leader.

The PLA’s regular harassment of Taiwan via air and sea patrols is proof that it is a powerful weapon in the hands of the CCP. In February, a Chinese task force also engaged in unprecedented naval gunnery in the Tasman Sea. Although it wasn’t against the law, China wanted to show Australasia that it can travel anywhere it wants.

According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission report: “China has persisted in endangering international security by engaging in gray-zone actions in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, despite its claims to be a source of international stability.

China has damaged vital underwater infrastructure and often conducts provocative military maneuvers in the South and East China Seas particularly close to Taiwan.

telecommunication lines in the Baltic Sea and close to Taiwan, and has intensified cyberattacks against the US.”

China has not only stepped up its hostile rhetoric and actions against Taiwan, but it has also harassed Japan close to the Senkaku Islands and attacked Manila in the South China Sea. Beijing employs “lawfare” to support its territorial sovereignty claims via its gray zone tactics.

The report of the US commission also stated, “Beyond its own borders, Beijing has continued to stoke violence and instability by supplying dual-use goods to Russia and otherwise helping sustain its war against Ukraine, funding Iran and its terrorist proxies in the Middle East, and intensifying cyberattacks on the United States and countries around the world.”

Additionally, China was accused by the US administration of giving North Korea material and diplomatic help to further its weapons and cyber programs. With Beijing furious with the United States’ acceptance of a major USD 11.1 billion weapons deal for Taiwan revealed on December 17, 2025, it is evident that Taiwan is still a hotspot.

According to Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) Center for China Analysis in the United States, 2026 will be crucial for Taiwan. Prospects for peace in the Taiwan Strait will probably depend on the always shifting political issues of how to preserve the shaky status quo between China, Taiwan, and the United States once new leaders are elected in Washington and Taipei in 2024.

Morris went on to say, “In 2026, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and US President Donald Trump will both have to face the difficulty of preserving the peace while juggling internal issues that might divert attention from this primary objective. Meanwhile, there are signs that the Chinese populace may be becoming impatient with nonmilitary means of accomplishing President Xi Jinping’s aim of peacefully reunifying Taiwan and mainland China.

In 2025, China boldly exerted influence beyond its borders, but the CCP also aimed to increase domestic control. According to the Commission’s annual report, China’s internal governance strategy has also aided its attempts to undermine US credibility and further its own objectives abroad. Over the last year, China has pushed on with its military modernization initiatives, intensified its anti-corruption drive to quell internal dissent, and maintained its long-standing attempts to control religious institutions that it believes are fostering separatism and undermining party authority.

The researchers said, “Considered in the aggregate, these actions reflect Beijing’s continued rapid preparations for the possibility of conflict and its systematic efforts to erode US deterrence across the military, economic, technological, cyber and diplomatic domains.”

Ensuring national security, strengthening technical self-reliance, and maintaining strict control over the CCP are Xi’s top concerns. These, in his opinion, are essential to China’s future development. Xi prioritizes loyalty above everything else, which implies that Chinese leaders are not always talented. Xi’s centralized structure stifles creativity and dynamism because his subordinates are scared to make a mistake.

In fact, elite advancement is largely dependent on their support for Xi’s programs. The highest levels of the CCP have been subjected to a severe anti-graft drive that has resulted in a record number of arrests and detentions.

Loyalty and governance are obviously at odds, especially because a new generation of leaders—especially those born in the 1970s—will take the lead at the 21st Party Congress in 2027–2028. According to specialists in an ASPI end-of-year evaluation, “In practice, Xi’s policies have led to a decline in governance capability, as evidenced by economic sluggishness, mismanagement of public health crises, and the intensification of international relations.”

“China’s economic system is under serious strain,” the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission said elsewhere. Without more significant structural change, which is still improbable for political reasons, Chinese leaders’ ability to handle the domestic slowdown has been limited by high debt levels and deteriorating fiscal capacity.

As a consequence, the economy is becoming more and more two-speed, with priority sectors for the party, including sophisticated manufacturing, continuing to get enough policy support and financial access while overall economic development is still under significant pressure.

Amid growing worries about stagnating earnings, unemployment, excessive family debt, and a poor social safety net, domestic spending is still muted.

The Chinese economy has slowed, local governments have a lot of debt, and the real estate market is still in its infancy. Because of the low birth rate, the workforce is likewise becoming smaller. The US has implemented export curbs, foreign investment is declining, and corporate and consumer confidence levels have fallen precipitously.

In 2023, domestic consumption was 41%, far lower than the US’s 69% level. China is thus still reliant on exports. ASPI said, “China has renewed its attempts to shift its focus toward consumption as a result of falling investment returns, growing bad debt, and rising trade tensions. Whether Beijing has the political will to tolerate the 2-3% annual GDP growth that true rebalancing would need is the key issue, not whether consumption-led growth is economically beneficial or a top goal for China’s leadership.

This reorganization is crucial because social stability will become more difficult to sustain in the absence of consumer-led development. This is worth keeping an eye on since China may either strengthen or change its consumption strategy in the next year.

In addition, China has a high rate of inequality, which contradicts its proclaimed socialist principles. Despite a 20 percent young unemployment rate, China has more billionaires than the United States. ASPI identified three strategic tensions—openness vs control, reliance versus distrust, and political will versus execution—that characterize the changing state-private sector interaction.

Thus, a “golden goose” problem arises. The CCP does not trust the entrepreneurs who created China’s technology boom, and it is working to control them to prevent them from gaining too much influence.

China’s economy is now more robust and self-sufficient in spite of these difficulties. Next year, China will unveil its 15th Five-Year Plan, which will span the years 2026–2030. Xi will want to show himself in the best possible light at the 21st Party Congress, which is set for 2027.

Since Xi has defied convention and positioned himself to rule China forever, this legitimacy is crucial. Due to tariffs imposed by both countries, the USA and China faced an uncontrollable decoupling in April 2025. In order to achieve “strategic stability,” as the US put it, the two were later able to negotiate a de-escalation. A pair of flare-ups in 2025 endangered that stability, and Xi’s threat to restrict the flow of rare-earth metals pushed Trump back to the bargaining table.

This demonstrated Xi’s confidence in relation to Trump rather than desperation. However, as Xi oversees Trump’s rotating tariff truces, uncertainty remains constant.

Late in 2025, China also shunned Japan when Beijing objected to remarks made by Sanae Takaichi, the prime minister of Japan. Such actions are popular domestically, but they are not well received outside. Indeed, China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy has helped it achieve its own objectives and tarnished its reputation, and international polls typically indicate that China is losing favor.

In contrast to the US’s haphazard actions, China has a well-thought-out plan to be ready for any confrontation. At the same time, the Chinese government is working to weaken US security networks with allies and undermine US deterrence.

The fundamental tenet of Xi’s philosophy is that the West is deteriorating while the East is growing. He thinks China will ultimately surpass the United States and take its position as the dominant force in the world. In 2025, he undoubtedly made some strides in that direction.